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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE PRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to publish one's views on any particular issue is pro-
tected from state infringement by the First Amendment.1 A prob-
lem arises when an individual who lacks printing facilities attempts
to publish editorial advertisements in privately owned newspapers.
Since he owns no printing press, should he have the right to rent
the paper's facilities and circulation to present his views?
The editorial advertisement is the same as a commercial adver-
tisement; however, the editorial advertisement usually concerns an
issue or controversy of a political nature. These advertisements are
common around elections, but then they are encouraged by news-
papers.2 The kinds of editorial advertisements which need the force
of the First Amendment to gain access to a newspaper's pages con-
cern other types of political questions, such as community labor
disputes.8 Both labor and management will want to make known
their side of the controversy and both may find that an advertise-
ment in the local paper is a better way to reach the public than
such familiar media as broadcasting facilities 4 or picket lines.5
This comment will examine the status of editorial advertise-
ments which depend on another's printing presses and established
circulation to reach the public. The effect of private ownership of
newspapers, the types of speech protected by the First Amendment,
and the special character of the press must be discussed in arriving
at a proposed solution to the editorial advertisement problem. The
similarities and distinctions between newspapers, private property
and broadcasting provide the bases for this discussion.
1 "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States." Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2 A newspaper is under no obligation to give political candidates equal
advertising space as is the holder of a broadcast license from the Fed-
eral Communications Commission.
3 See Lincoln Star, April 29, 1970, at 15 for an example of such an
advertisement.
4 Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
5 Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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II. THE PRESS AND COMMUNICATION
A. STATE V. PRIVATE AcTIoN
Discussion of the problems surrounding access to the press
should properly begin with two cases directly on point. In Chicago
Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, AFL-CIO v.
Chicago Tribune Co.,6 the plaintiff labor union wanted to print an
advertisement in the Chicago Tribune and other major Chicago
dailies presenting its position in a labor dispute with Marshall
Fields Department Store' The Federal District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois granted the defendant newspaper's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the case, emphasizing the
lack of state action attributable to the private newspaper. As the
court stated: "[P]laintiff's position that newspapers are quasi-public
bodies has clearly been rejected by the judiciary."8
Four days earlier the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin rendered a declaratory judgment that the
Royal Purple, a campus newspaper of Wisconsin State University in
Whitewater, could not refuse to print an editorial advertisement
criticizing the Vietnam war. Such a refusal was held to be a denial
of the advertiser's freedom of speech. This was an impermissible
infringement of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under color of
law because of the newspaper's connection with a state tax-sup-
ported institution.9
The complaint in the Chicago case alleged that the plaintiffs had
a right to advertise in the Tribune. The court summarily dismissed
two claims based on acceptance of a standing offer to contract and
detrimental reliance on a standing offer to contract. 0 The first
allegation, in which the plaintiff argued that the Tribune was a
quasi-public entity which could not refuse to publish the union's
advertisement without violating- their constitutional rights to free
speech and equal protection, was given thorough examination.
The court held that some state action was necessary to give rise
to an unconstitutional abridgement of the right to free speech."
The court recognized that other kinds of private property have
been held to be affected with public character, which confers First
Amendment and other constitutional protections. Some cases, nota-
6 307 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
7 Id. at 423.
8 Id. at 427.
9 Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D.
Wis. 1969). See also Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass.
1970).
10 307 F. Supp. at 424-25.
11 "[The Fourteenth Amendment] does not protect against wrongs done
by private persons." Id. at 425.
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bly Marsh v. Alabama,12 involved private ownership and control of
the physical premises on which people live or work. However, Chi-
cago Joint Board rejected any analogy between the newspaper sit-
uation and those cases. The court found that a newspaper was part
of a special industry for which the Constitution had carved out
special treatment. 13 The kinds of property involved in Marsh and
the cases following its lead were simply not applicable to the
press.14
Disassociation of press and government is a status secured by
the First Amendment. It does not follow, however, that the courts
may not require the privately owned press to accept and print
advertisements advocating a particular cause.' 5 In fact, the news-
paper's refusal to print such advertising may be an abridgement of
First Amendment rights.
Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges8 also involved a
private citizen's attempt to place an editorial advertisement in a
newspaper. The plaintiff in Lee, however, desired to place his adver-
tisement in the school newspaper operated by Wisconsin State
University at Whitewater. Thus, refusal to run the advertisement
was censorship asserted through state action, and could only be
upheld in the face of "a clear and present danger.' 1 7
In granting the plaintiffs' action for a declaratory judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (c), the court agreed that
plaintiffs had a right to effective expression of their views.' 8 It was
clear that the plaintiffs' anti-war message could be presented more
forcefully and effectively by use of photographs, large type, and a
full page presentation than by a letter to the editor. Therefore the
plaintiffs had standing to present their case.' 9
12 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
13 307 F. Supp. at 426.
'4 "Finally the Marsh and Logan Valley decisions rested on the finding
that privately owned territory was indistinguishable, in terms of pub-
lic access and use, from non-privately owned towns, business districts,
and shopping centers." Id. at 427.
15 The court in Chicago Joint Board obviously disagreed: "Yet, if, in
many respects, private censorship is no better than public censorship,
the fact remains that the right to free speech was never intended to
include the right to use the other fellow's presses. . . ." Id. at 429.
16 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
17 Id. at 1101.
Is Id.
19 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1963), calling
editorial advertisements "an important out for the promulgation of
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access
to publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech
even though they are not members of the press."
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The presentation of views through an advertisement in a campus
newspaper is no less violative of the sanctity of the press than place-
ment of a similar type of advertisement in a privately owned news-
paper. In neither situation does the paper suffer any interference
with their news presentation or editorial position. In both situations
the individuals placing or attempting to place advertisements wish
only to rent space, printing presses and use of the paper's circu-
lation.
A thorough examination of other situations where individuals
have been able to purchase space and circulation for editorial ad-
vertisements through quasi-public and public facilities will under-
score the inconsistency in the outcomes of Lee and Chicago Joint
Board.
B. RIGHT TO CoIiIUNICATE THROUGH OTHER PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
FAcILITIEs
In the course of deciding the merits of the controversy, other
cases involving the right to present views to the public through the
use of some existing medium or facility have discussed the relative
interests of the parties involved. Of particular interest is the state
courts' treatment of the right to advertise in private newspapers
and in space provided on transit facilities, and the right to use
public buildings for political meetings.
1. State Courts and the Press
Uhlman v. Sherman20 is the only case which has held that the
private individual's right to use another person's printing presses
by advertising in his newspaper does not infringe upon the news-
paper's right to freedom of the press. In Uhlman the Ohio
court found that the quasi-public character of the newspaper re-
quired that once advertising space was sold to others of the class to
which plaintiff belonged, it must be made equally available to all
of that class. Those willing to comply with reasonable rules as to
the character and length of advertisements could not be refused
space. The court expressly grounded the decision on policy consid-
erations, freely admitting there was no precedent for the holding
as applied to newspapers. Although language of the holding suggests
equal protection considerations, the court pointed out that they were
not suggesting that the newspaper had the same legal status as an
amusement center, inn, or common carrier. A newspaper acquired
its quasi-public status by virtue of the sale of advertising space to
a general public class.2'1
20 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (1919).
21 "We therefore believe that a newspaper company when it has adver-
tising space to sell has no right to discriminate against a local mer-
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The Uhlman court also mentioned the favors that government
had bestowed upon newspapers. Often legislation requires that no-
tices be printed in local newspapers to inform the community of
certain facts which have legal consequences. All such legislation
generates business for the newspaper. Whether the Ohio court
meant to hint that this also gives rise to quasi-public status or is in
fact state action was not made clear. However, the South Dakota
Supreme Court has considered that question.
In Mack v. Costello22 the plaintiff wanted to petition to have his
land removed from the corporate limits of the city, but to do so he
had to publish notice in a newspaper published in the city or town
where the petition was presented. When the local newspaper re-
fused to print the plaintiff's notice, the trial court ordered it to do
so. In dismissing the writ ordering the paper to print the notice, the
supreme court commented that if plaintiff was thwarted in his at-
tempted compliance with the law it was up to the legislature to
dictate an alternative. A newspaper is a private business, and its
publisher assumes no "office, trust, or station," in the public sense
of the word; nor does he enter into any public or contractual rela-
tion with the community at large. Ironically, the South Dakota
court felt that if the publication of a newspaper was a quasi-public
business it was only because from long existence it was regarded
as a public necessity. It seems the court had ample policy and factual
considerations in Mack to find that the paper was involved in public
activity and that even if tax dollars did not help support the paper,
at least a certain percentage of income may have come from dollars
which the legislative body required to be paid to the newspaper for
its services. The publication of the notices in no way interfered with
the news or editorial policy of the newspaper, and the legislature,
by requiring that notices be published, had implicitly recognized
that the use of another's presses and circulation in no way inter-
fered with the publisher's right to the freedom of the press.
23
chant who in his application for advertising complies with law and
reasonable newspaper rules." Id. at 235, 31 Ohio Dec. at 63.
22 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913).
23 See also J. J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343
Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961), where, in a tort action against a
newspaper publisher for refusal to accept plaintiff's advertising, the
court affirmed the defendant's demurrer. A newspaper is under no
obligation to accept advertising from all who apply for it. The court
took judicial notice that a newspaper was not a public utility. See
Note, Torts-Newspapers-Publishers of a Newspaper Under No Obli-
gation to Accept Advertising, 37 NOTRF DAME LAWYER 575 (1962), in-
cluding a discussion of Gordon's treatment of Uhlman and Mack.
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Although Mack was typical of state court treatment of the access
problem, a recent case may reveal a shift in judicial thinking. The
dissent in Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc 4 expressly stated it
could not agree with the sweeping proposition that a newspaper is
"a purely private business and, therefore, free to contract with and
do business with whomsoever the publishers thereof see fit, and
conversely, free to refuse to contract with and do business with
any parties they choose to reject."25
The question in Bloss was whether plaintiff had a right to have the
defendant newspaper publish his motion picture advertisement. The
court dismissed the complaint, holding that even under Uhlman the
action might fail since the advertisement did not meet publication
standards. Justice Adams would have first asked if the defendant
newspaper had conducted its business in a purely private manner
with no holding out to the public of its columns for advertising,
and second, had the advertisement offered by the plaintiff met de-
fendant's publishing standards?26
The dissenting justice insisted that the decision on the merits
should not
preclude future plaintiffs-political candidates, commercial enter-
prises, governmental units-from the right to insist upon access to
newspaper coverage upon equal terms where a newspaper controls
the sole means of daily paid printed communication within a given
area and the newspaper has held itself out generally to the public
as affording such means of communication, subject to its rules and
regulations. 27
Although the Bloss case was not resolved in the plaintiff's favor,
the fact that the court recognized the validity of the Uhlman exam-
ination of a newspaper's conduct where an advertisement meets
publication standards is encouraging.2 Especially significant is the
dissent's concern with the manner in which the defendant had con-
ducted his business: its actual public character. If the parties' inter-
ests and relative positions are given consideration in reaching a
decision, the holding would seem to have more validity than a
decision like Mack.
24 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968).
25 Id. at 490, 157 N.W.2d at 244 (Adams, J., dissenting).
26 Id.
27 Id. Sounding much like the Uhlman court, the Bloss dissent empha-
sized the right of one person to have the newspaper publish adver-
tising upon the same terms and conditions as set for other persons.
Contra, Approved Personnel v. Tribune Company, 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla.
App. 1965).
28 380 Mich. at 487-88, 157 N.W.2d at 242. Justice Souris did not concur
with this portion of the court's holding.
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The incorporation of freedom of speech and press into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is too settled a legal
reality to be discussed here. However, other writers have given the
subject excellent treatment and their work is an important source
for analysis of this area. Basically most articles speak of the rights
of speech and press in broad terms indicating that both rights need
to be exercised free of restriction, and such exercise must be ac-
tively promoted.29 The importance of fostering freedom of communi-
cation is especially essential in a country such as the United States
and the courts should recognize and nurture this concept. 30
Other writers, dealing specifically with commercial expression,
have emphasized that along with the standard types of constitu-
tionally protected speech other expression can gain constitutional
protection by the economic interests it represents.
Although the Supreme Court has not held expressly that union
and corporate political expression is protected by the first amend-
ment, the Court's construction of several federal statutes suggests
that it is.31
While the Supreme Court has expressly held that "the facts of a
labor dispute must be regarded as within the area of free discus-
sion that is guaranteed by the Constitution,"32 it might be argued
that the advertisement offered in Chicago Joint Board was only
union propaganda and not a presentation of the "facts" of the dis-
pute. The fact remains that, in view of the types of union activity
or expression protected in the picketing cases, it seems doubtful
that the Supreme Court has not actually recognized that such union
expression is protected by the First Amendment.
Thus it appears that placing advertisements in newspapers,
whether for commercial or political-commercial purposes, falls
within the area of speech which the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect. If that is so, the apposite factor again becomes the
29 "[U]nless the right to freedom of communication is wisely interpreted,
its continuance may be jeopardized." Carroll, Natural Law and Free-
dom of Communication Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 NOTRE
DAIvE LAWYER 219, 231 (1966) (footnote omitted).
30 "To be sure, not all peoples have been sufficiently developed or fortu-
nate enough to realize that aspect of their human nature that calls for
political participation. But where, as in the United States, institutions
for political participation exist, the duty to implement and improve
by protecting political rights, including the right to communicate, is
evident." Id. at 224.
31 Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1191, 1193 (1965).
32 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). Accord, Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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nature and conduct of the paper itself and not the type of expres-
sion which the individual is offering for circulation. The second test
of the Bloss case is met whenever a legitimate political-community
interest issue is offered for publication. To better appreciate the
application of this conduct test which determines if the newspaper
has held itself out generally to the public, an examination of state
cases concerning advertising through other types of facilities will
be profitable.
2. Advertising on Public Transportation
In 1967, two cases affirmed an individual's right to advertise his
views on space provided or sold to the public at large. In Kissinger
v. New York City Transit Authority,m the Students for a Democratic
Society wanted to post placards on the walls and in the trains of the
New York subway system showing a girl partially burned by
napalm and urging an end to the Vietnam war. They were denied
the right to do so by the transit authorities because the signs to be
posted did not fall into one of the three categories for which the
Authority accepted advertising-commercial, public service, or po-
litical at times of elections. The court in Kissinger found sufficient
state action to raise the application of the civil rights laws.34 Absent
a showing of clear and present danger, the posters were protected
speech; consequently they were to be exhibited in the available
space, which a private advertising firm leased from the city.35
In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District," the Women
for Peace wished to run advertisements in defendant's motor
coaches, advocating negotiation and immediate peace in Vietnam.
The advertising company which controlled rental space declined the
organization's offer whereupon they sought an order requiring the
defendant to run the advertisement.
Wirta held for the plaintiffs, finding that the refusal was a denial
of free speech and that the exclusion of advertising not connected
with a political campaign was a denial of equal protection.37
33 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
34 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
35 274 F. Supp. at 442.
36 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
37 The holding was not totally without precedent. See note 38 and accom-
panying text infra.
The court perhaps incorrectly dismissed the defendant's contention
that the task of insuring equal treatment for all views was too great
to require him to give advertising space to all who might apply. It
found the contention without merit since this type of advertising was
no different than speech in a public park, carrying no endorsement,
and thus not requiring that those of opposing positions necessarily be
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The treatment of the transit cases shows that courts are willing
to promote exercise of First Amendment rights through advertising
whenever public discussion has been encouraged by a party with
available facilities. The holding is applicable by analogy to news-
papers, and probably would have already been so applied had not
the word press in the First Amendment been interpreted only as
protection for private interest. The failure to treat advertising col-
umns of newspapers identically to advertising space in privately
controlled transit facilities indicates a failure to realize that a news-
paper can be separated into two distinct identities; the First Amend-
ment in using the word press is arguably concerned only with
newspapers' opinions and news presentation.
3. Other Communication Media
California had compelling authority in Wirta to recognize the
women's organization's right to use the transit authority's available
advertising space. The California Supreme Court, in Danskin v. San
Diego Unified School District,8 had sustained the grant of a writ of
mandamus to petitioner requiring the defendant school board to
give him unconditional permission to use the high school audito-
rium. The court, in a lengthy opinion by Justice Traynor, surveyed
the First Amendment protection of speech, but anchored the deci-
sion on the fact that while the school board was under no duty to
make their facilities available to the public for general use, if it
elected to do so it could not arbitrarily prevent certain members of
the public from holding meetings therein. Nor could it make the
privilege of holding meetings dependent upon conditions that would
deprive any members of the public of their constitutional rights.3 9
Borrowing from the Holmes concept of freedom of speech, the
court pointed out that in the competitive struggle of ideas for ac-
ceptance, the ideas which the board found acceptable were not
entitled to any advantage such as pronouncement in a forum where
competition had been diminished by censorship. The dulling effect
of censorship on community discussion is to be more feared than
the quickening influence of a live interchange of ideas.
given the same treatment. But see Comment, Constitutional Law-
Transit District May Not Constitutionally Restrict Paid Advertising so
as to Exclude Opinions and Beliefs Within the Ambit of First Amend-
ment Protection, 43 Noas DAME LAWYER 781 (1968).
38 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
39 Id. at 545, 171 P.2d at 891. "The convictions or affiliations of one who
requests the use of a school building as a forum is of no more concern
to the school administrators than to a superintendent of parks or
streets if the forum is the green or the market place." Id. at 547, 171
P.2d at 892.
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A similar problem in Ohio resulted in dissimilar treatment. In
State ex rel. Greisinger v. Grand Rapids Board of Education,40 a
local statute gave the board of education discretionary power to
grant or deny applications of organizations to use the school audi-
torium. The court found that the refusal of an application of a
religious sect, most of whose members were not citizens of the
community and whose tenets were not consonant with the school's
teachings of principles of good citizenship, was not a denial of the
plaintiff's constitutional right of speech, worship, or assembly. Pre-
sumably the absence of any equal protection language in the opinion
indicates that the board had not made it a policy to hold the build-
ings out to the public. The case seems consistent with the Danskin
test of whether the facilities had been available to others in the past.
III. COMMUNICATION AND THE RIGHT
TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. FEDERAL RECOGN iON
While private newspapers have been allowed to shield them-
selves from an individual's access to their galleys, other owners of
private property have found the courts willing to pierce the veil of
private ownership to recognize what is actually a public entity.
Marsh v. Alabam 4 was the forerunner of many state and federal
cases holding that there is a right to espouse a particular cause on
land owned by another without that owner's consent.
Marsh involved the distribution of leaflets by Jehovah's Wit-
nesses in the business district of Chickasaw, Alabama, a company
town owned by Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. In reversing Marsh's
conviction for trespassing, the Supreme Court discounted any notion
that ownership of the town's business district by a corporation or
defendants' lack of residency was sufficient to sanction infringement
of Marsh's right to free expression.42
The Marsh doctrine was reaffirmed and given added significance
in Amalagamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.4 The scene of the dispute was a shopping center, and the
issue again was access to another's private property to communicate
personal views. The Court compared Logan Valley to Marsh:
40 88 Ohio App. 364, 100 N.E.2d 294 (1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820
(1950).
41 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
42 "In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and
freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish
this from any other town and shopping center except the fact that
title to property belongs to the corporation." Id. at 503.
43 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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It is clear that if the shopping center premises were not privately
owned but instead constituted the business area of a municipality,
which they to a large extent resemble, petitioners could not be
barred from exercising their First Amendment rights there on the
sole ground that title to the property was in the municipality.44
Petitioners desired to picket on the property of the concern with
whom the union was having a labor dispute. The shopping center
felt that the union only had a right to picket along the street adja-
cent to the shopping center. The Supreme Court held that the Marsh
and Logan Valley situations were identical.45
Even after Logan Valley there remained considerable doubt
about the kinds of picketing which would be allowed access to pri-
vate property. Logan Valley was explicit in limiting its holding to
the situation presented therein, the picketing of a store by those
having a grievance with it.46 In the most recent case, an Oregon
federal court interpreted Logan Valley to expand the access pro-
vided by the Supreme Court. Tanner v. Lloyd Corporation47 in-
volved the owner of a shopping center who held his land open to
the general public for business purposes. Plaintiffs were veterans
passing out anti-Vietnam leaflets on the center mall. To the extent
the land was the functional equivalent of a public business district,
the owner was held to have given up the right to prohibit distribu-
tion of literature thereon, or to decide where literature might be
distributed. However, the court knew it was making a rule not
required by the Logan Valley doctrine: "If Logan Valley does not
go as far as I suggest, the First Amendment does. '48 Tanner holds
that the public need for uncensored information should not be
frustrated.
The district court took judicial notice that the defendant in
Tanner permitted other groups "to use the mall even though they
do not add to 'customer motivation.' -49 That fact brings the Danskin
analysis into play; once a facility is held open to the public, those
controlling it cannot pick and choose those it will allow to exercise
their rights through its use.
44 Id. at 315.
45 The shopping center and the sidewalks and parking lots were like the
company town, "in short . . . accessible to and freely used by the
public in general .... ." Id. at 317 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama).
46 The Court stated it was not considering picketing of shopping centers
for purposes other than for those connected with the operation of the
center. Id. at 320 n.9.
47 308 F.Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
48 Id. at 132.
49 Id. at 129.
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The impact of Logan Valley on an individual's right to commu-
nicate has been described as only a sanctioning of what the state
courts had already done,50 and the only logical extension of Marsh.5 1
To the extent that Tanner rests on Logan Valley, however, it ap-
pears that Logan Valley may more properly be viewed as a positive
policy statement by the Supreme Court on how the shopping center,
as a socioeconomic phenomenon, will be treated in the law.
While the reach of Marsh and Logan Valley is still in doubt as
far as the Supreme Court is concerned, Tanner is a very positive
interpretation of those cases, recognizing that private property may
exist on two planes. On one the owner has the right to control the
property in such a way as to maximize his desires. But once the
management of private property holds that property open for public
use the property owner may not deny its public character. The
courts have not invaded the private use or management of the
owner's property; there has been a balance struck between the Fifth
and First Amendments and the First Amendment has been pre-
ferred.
IV. THE BROADCASTING MEDIA
AND COMMUNICATION
The Federal Communications Commission is the agency in charge
of the federally regulated broadcasting industry. Broadcasting bears
a clear resemblance to newspapers; in fact the purposes behind
many of the rules applied to the broadcasting media may be more
applicable to the newspaper industry.
A. RED LION Doc mnE
The controversy in Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.5 2 arose
after personal attacks on the reputation and character of an indi-
vidual were made over the radio station owned by Red Lion. The
individual's request for equal time to refute the charges was denied
by the station. Acting pursuant to its fairness doctrine, which re-
quires that time be given to an individual who requests it to answer
a personal attack,3 the F.C.C. ordered Red Lion Broadcasting to
50 See Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Constr. Workers, 61
Cal. 2d 266, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964); Hood v. Stafford,
213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964); Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union, AFL-CIO v. Wonderland Shopping Center, 370 Mich. 547, 122
N.W.2d 785 (1963); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees, Local
No. 444, AFL-CIO, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
51 Note, The Union's Right to Picket on Private Property, 48 ORE. L. REv.
426, 428 (1969).
52 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
53 The fairness doctrine also requires equal time be given to any inter-
ested party in a public controversy.
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give equal time to the requesting party. The broadcasting company
challenged the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine as an
abridgement of its freedom of speech. The Supreme Court, in its
first decision on the merits of the fairness doctrine, upheld the
F.C.C.:
Believing that the specific application of the fairness doctrine in
Red Lion, and the promulgation of the regulations in [an accom-
panying case] are both authorized by Congress and enhance rather
than abridge the freedoms of speech and press protected by the
First Amendment, we hold them valid and constitutional .... 54
The Court traced the history of broadcast regulation and affirmed
the need to keep the media available to all those who were not for-
tunate enough to have a license to broadcast. The two-fold duty to
give adequate coverage to public issues and to give accurate cover-
age to each side of a controversy would not be enforceable without
the fairness doctrine supplanting the existing statutes.5
The Red Lion decision was grounded on First Amendment con-
cepts expressed in Associated Press v. United States: 56
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be
the Government itself or a private licensee.57
It has been suggested that although the limited access rationale
used to justify broadcast regulations supports the fairness doctrine
as applied to personal attacks, it is an untenable justification for
application of the doctrine when controversial issues have been
broadcast. "Because a genuinely controversial issue will get other
public exposure, the FCC should take into consideration the activi-
ties of other media .... 58
It is possible that, even considering the activities of other media,
the fairness doctrine still requires equal time from a broadcasting
medium when public issues are involved. The impact of a live
broadcast, weighed against the force of printed material, is far from
slight.59 Furthermore, the presence of direct state action in licensing
54 395 U.S. at 375.
55 Id. at 382. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
56 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
57 395 U.S. at 390.
58 Note, Fairness Doctrine: Personal Attacks and Public Controversies, 56
GEo. L. J. 547, 554 (1968) (footnote omitted).
59 See Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Federal Commu-
nications Commission's Fairness Doctrine is Constitutional, 13 VML. L.
REv. 393 (1968). The writer seems to make the same point by asserting
that in Red Lion it is difficult to tell if it is the medium which dictates
the decision or the First Amendment.
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broadcast stations adds weight to arguments for the necessity of
regulation to guarantee that the state does not indirectly favor one
party or another in the exercise of First Amendment rights. Thus,
the regulation found constitutional in Red Lion rests on both the
limited access rationale and the state action concept.
It has been suggested that if the reason for public regulation of
broadcasting is the public's limited access to those facilities,60 then
the fairness doctrine should be applied to newspapers as well. 6' It
is clear that everyone cannot obtain a license to operate a radio
station, and consequently access to broadcasting facilities is limited;
however, the economic barriers to entering the newspaper industry
just as effectively limit access to the printing press.62
On second glance the apparent analogue breaks down. The licens-
ing factor makes the broadcasting medium unique, 3 and regulation
of broadcasting can reasonably be based only on this licensing-state
action characteristic.64 The time allowed on radio and television for
public debate must not favor one side over another or government
will have indirectly interfered with an individual's freedom of
speech. Although improved broadcasting techniques make the num-
ber of available frequencies almost limitless,65 licensing insures that
only a limited number of stations will service a given geographical
area.
This state licensing factor clearly differentiates the broadcasting
and newspaper media. If a basic right to access to the press does
exist, it must have an independent constitutional basis.66
60 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
61 Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40
Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 Mnm. L. REv. 67, 157
(1967); Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and Pro-
gram Regulation-Violation of the First Amendment?, 41 NEB. L. REv.
826 (1962).
62 According to a recent count there were 6,602 radio and television li-
censes and 1,751 daily newspapers. Robinson, supra note 61, at 157.
63 Comment, supra note 61.
64 "Indeed as one licensed to operate in a public domain, the licensee
has assumed the obligation of presenting all sides of important public
questions, fairly, objectively and without bias." Mayflower Broadcast-
ing Co., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940). See also Barron, Access to the Press-
A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Note,
Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C-Extension of the Fairness
Doctrine to Include Right of Access to the Press, 15 S.D.L. REv. 172
(1970).
65 The creation of UHF and FM stations make available frequencies lim-
itless in actuality.
66 See Comment, Administrative Law-FCC Fairness Doctrine-Applica-
bility to Advertising, 53 IowA L. REv. 480 (1967). While the First
Amendment applies equally to all modes of communication, the factual
differences between one medium and another may sustain dissimilar
treatment. Joseph Burstein, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
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V. CONCLUSION-ACCESS TO THE PRESS
A. THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE
There can be little doubt that the Constitution and the courts
recognize and find essential a First Amendment right to communi-
cate. The idea can be traced through Gitlow to Logan Valley, but
the conclusion is best summed up in Justice Brennan's simple state-
ment: "Freedom of expression in areas of public affairs is an
absolute."67
Communication has taken the form of door-to-door solicitation,68
assemblies, 9 criticism of public officials in the press, 70 passing out
leaflets on private property7 1 and picketing,72 but in all these situa-
tions the message is the same as Justice Brennan articulated. The
cases have often involved balancing rights existing under different
amendments. First Amendment rights have invariably been pre-
ferred.
The state courts have zealously protected the right of groups or
parties to have equal use of communications facilities dedicated to
the public, whether those facilities were political or commercial in
nature. This equal use protection raises a question with considera-
tions similar to the personal attack portion of the fairness doctrine.
Does one attacked in a newspaper have a right to answer that attack
in the same medium? The newspaper can point to its letters column
as providing such an opportunity, but no one can seriously claim
that a letter appearing there has the same effect as a headline ap-
pearing prominently on a news page. Since the right to buy adver-
tising space in the newspaper could provide the individual attacked
with the appropriate forum, the personal attack question can be
regarded as subsumed in the major theme of this comment: recog-
nition of a right to use the newspaper's printing presses, galley
space and circulation to make a point effectively.
B. Is LEGISLATIVE ACTION A PREREQUISITE?
While statutes requiring licensing are the keys to access to the
broadcast media, any statute providing for access to newspapers
would be faced with the same tests as the plaintiff's action in Chi-
67 Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1, 12 (1965).
68 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
69 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
70 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
71 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
72 Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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cago Joint Board. Any right of access to the press will need its own
constitutional foundation. It is suggested that such a basis can be
provided by the individual's right to freedom of the press and the
dual nature of newspapers coupled with the economic limitations
preventing an individual from operating his own newspaper.
If an individual had a right to have an editorial advertisement
printed, the publisher of the newspaper would not find his own edi-
torial policy or news interpretation affected. Judicial action would
require only that the right to place an advertisement be granted.
In addition, New York Times Co. v. Sullivav7 3 protects the publisher
from liability for the publication of almost all such advertisements. 74
C. NEWSPAPERS AND THE FIRST AmENDMENT
It has been argued that realism requires recognition that the
right to expression is not very substantial if it can be exercised
only at the will of those who manage mass communications.
Too little attention has been paid to defining the purposes which
the first amendment protection is designed to achieve and to iden-
tifying the addressees of that protection. 75
The dualistic view of newspapers recognizes the publisher as a pri-
mary addressee of that protection. As Jerome Barron points out,
judicial treatment of the press is exemplified by Justice Black's
concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Black
"seems to identify the 'press' with the 'people' and to think immu-
nity from suit for newspapers is equivalent to enhancing the right
of free expression for all members of the community .. Any
hope that the Burger Court might take a more realistic view of the
press in the access problem is discounted by Barron because of a
dictum which the Chief Justice wrote while a Circuit Court Judge
in the otherwise pioneer decision Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v F.C.C.:77
A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a
limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts
that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations. A
newspaper can be operated at the whim or caprice of its owners;
a broadcast station cannot.78
73 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
74 "Abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs
those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective
exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of
popular government." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
75 Barron, supra note 64, at 1648.
76 Id. at 1658.
77 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
78 Id. at 1003.
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Barron's pessimism is perhaps unwarranted, for if the statement
is read in light of uniqueness-because-of-licensing analysis, it is a
correct view of the broadcasting-newspaper distinctions. The fact
that licensing of broadcasters makes that medium's public access
requirements inapposite with respect to the right of access to the
newspaper does not, however, preclude recognition of a right to
communicate ideas through the press on some other ground.
While courts continue to deny the public character of a news-
paper, the market keeps forcing the major dailies into a monopoly
position. Barron may be close to the real reason the press will some
day find itself subject to others' First Amendment access rights in
his reliance on this movement toward monopoly and Justice Doug-
las's open-ended "public function" theory in Evans v. Newton.79
If the parks located on private lands in Evans could not escape
the stigma of public character due to the public services they ren-
dered, it seems "that a newspaper, which is the common journal of
printed communication in a community, could not escape the con-
stitutional restrictions which a quasi-public status invites."80 It
remains to be seen whether courts will finally attach the public
entity label to newspapers, thereby obligating the press to respect
the exercise of a person's First Amendment rights. In absence of
this, it is suggested that freedom of the press includes the right of
a party to rent the paper's facilities through its advertising depart-
ment for the purpose of effectively presenting one's ideas.
The courts have held that the public needs to be informed about
the type of controversy involved in Chicago Joint Board.8 ' By deny-
ing the union's editorial advertisement, the paper denied the use of
an effective means of presenting the union case to the people of
Chicago. The result was either a denial of free speech by a quasi-
public, limited entry facility or a denial of freedom of the press to
a citizen trying to exercise that right.
Douglas F. Duchek '71
79 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See Barron, supra note 64, at 1669.
80 Barron, supra note 64, at 1669.
81 "In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
